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Abstract 
This study intends to analyse the impact of the ownership structure on the corporate 
performance in the gas transmission industry. Most of the existing studies on the 
ownership structure and its influence on the value of the companies or on their 
performances are not focused in specific sectors or industries.  Hence, the present study 
intends to complement the already existing approaches focusing on this particular 
industry. The subject of the study is relevant and pertinent as it is a regulated industry 
which has a strong impact on the prices charged to the final consumers, and also due to 
the vulnerability of the European Natural Gas sector because of the high dependency of 
imports. This study is intended to contribute to the scarce empirical literature on the gas 
industry particularly under the performance-ownership structure perspective.  
Key words: ownership structure, state ownership, corporate performance, efficiency, 
oil & gas, gas transmission 
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1. Introduction 
The influence of the ownership structure in the performance and value of the companies 
is a hot topic in Finance and Economics. State ownership, for instance, is viewed as 
inefficient, because the political motives of the government are not aligned with the 
profit motives (Leung & Cheng, 2013), the main argument for privatizations worldwide. 
With this work it is intended to analyse the influence of the ownership structure in the 
performance of companies. More specifically, the main focus of this work will rely on 
the oil&gas industry, namely in the transmission of gas in high pressure. 
Additionally, as the sector mentioned is very specific, it is intended to assess if the State 
presence in the ownership structure of companies affects its performance positively or 
negatively, or if there is a critical level of State ownership above which the performance 
of companies is negatively influenced. 
Due to the definition of the dependent variable, it will be searched a relationship 
between the ownership structure and the performance, measured by the market values or 
by appropriate financial indicators. 
To achieve so, the goal of this work is to perform a comparative study of the 
performance of companies in the sector with different ownership structures across 
Europe, in order to capture differences in the ownership structures throughout the 
continent. 
Moreover, this work aims to assess if the presence of the State in the ownership of 
companies has a significant impact in their performance, and if it has, in what direction 
it is reflected (positive or negative).  
Furthermore, other factors linked to the presence of the State may influence the 
performance of companies, such as efficiency or the political activity (Hadani, 2011). 
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The relationship between ownership and firm performance has been highly subject to 
research. However, the empirical evidence has not yet provided conclusive results (Yu, 
2013), leaving the scientific community with mixed results so far, which reinforces the 
importance of its study. As far as we know, the gas transmission industry has not been 
addressed under this perspective, which can be considered as a gap in the literature. 
Additionally, the energy industry is of the utmost importance in the world, as the 
economies of developed countries show a huge energetic dependence on the countries 
that have the resources to produce energy. Consequently, the companies in this industry 
play a very important role in the economy.  
Studying the factors that influence these companies’ performance is very important in 
the field of finance, as it may lead to the search for the definition of an optimal structure 
for companies of this industry. 
Moreover, it may lead to the study of the ownership structure that provides the best 
results in terms of efficiency, because it is reflected in the prices charged to the 
consumers. 
Given the framework given by the literature review and the purpose of this work, the 
main questions to put are: 
 Does the ownership structure of companies in the gas transmission industry 
impact their performances? 
 How does the State Ownership affect the performance of the companies in the 
gas transmission industry? 
This Dissertation is organised as follows: in chapter 2, it is performed a literature review 
on the subject being analysed and the definition of the most relevant concepts addressed 
in the study; in chapter 3, it is presented the methodology and the sample, as well as the 
specification of the model used; in chapter 4, the conclusions of the study are presented.  
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2. Literature Review 
It has been given significant attention to the ownership issue and its impact on corporate 
value or performance. In this section, it will be performed a review of the literature on 
the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance.  
Firstly, it will be presented the most relevant concepts for the work, such as ownership 
structure, state ownership, corporate performance and main indicators to analyse and 
measure it. Then, it will be performed a critical analysis to the literature. 
To begin with, it is important to define the relevant concepts that the present work will 
address. 
2.1. Ownership Structure 
The ownership structure refers to the shareholders of the companies and the way the 
shares are distributed by them. It demonstrates the decisional power of each shareholder 
on the company and the concept can be defined as the structure of shareholdings of a 
firm, according to Wu (2011) and Karathanassis and Drakos (2004). 
For instance, a shareholder with more than 5% stake on a company’s equity is said to be 
a blockholder, because this percentage is high enough for the shareholder to have the 
incentive and ability to influence and monitor the decisions taken in the company 
(Denis, 2001). This is a very important concept for this study, as for the industry under 
analysis the main players do not run their businesses in perfect competition conditions. 
Such as happens in the electricity industry, regulation in the natural gas transmission 
industry is primarily motivated by the existence of natural monopoly conditions and 
externalities, whether it is a state owned or a private monopoly (Steiner, 2000), as 
electricity transmission and distribution are currently characterized by natural monopoly 
cost conditions (Kiesling, 2006).  
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According to Steiner (2000), characteristics such as the non-storability reduce the size 
of markets according to the time dimension, as the size of the market is determined by 
instantaneous demand rather than demand over a longer time period. Hence, the 
probability that a single firm can supply consumers in a certain market at minimum 
efficient scale is higher.  
Consequently, operating and capital costs per customer decrease and these conditions 
lead to increasing returns to scale and cost efficiencies to be realised by a monopoly 
market structure. 
Additionally, natural gas markets exhibit properties of networks. Natural monopolies 
have as main characteristic lower average costs as production increases. Network 
externalities generate changes in value as participation increases. Accordingly, positive 
network externality occurs when the value of a product or service increases as more 
people use it (Economides, 1995). 
In the context of this study, it is important to figure out if (and how) the ownership 
structure of these monopolist companies influences their performances, in a regulated 
market in which competition is promoted but also where competitive entries erode 
economic rents. 
The current regulatory environment in which the natural gas industry operates is much 
less stringent and relies more heavily upon competitive forces than in the past. The last 
twenty years have seen dramatic changes throughout the industry, spurred by its ever-
changing regulatory environment. However, despite the restructuring and deregulation 
of some portions of the natural gas supply chain, there is still significant regulatory 
oversight of the industry in the transportation and distribution of natural gas. This 
oversight is necessary to ensure that those market participants that possess monopoly 
power in the industry do not abuse this power or distort the smooth and efficient 
functioning of the natural gas markets.  
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One of the main aims of the Third Package is setting non-discriminatory rules for 
access conditions to natural gas transmission systems taking into account the special 
characteristics of national and regional markets with a view to ensuring the proper 
functioning of the internal market in gas, a goal that is in line with the above-mentioned 
anti-abuse principle. 
Regulatory action recently has focused on unbundling retail prices into separate 
generation, transmission, distribution and retailing cost charges. Additionally, it has 
focused on allowing retail consumers to choose among a large number of competing 
generation service suppliers (Kiesling, 2006).  
2.2. State Ownership 
State ownership is a very well-known concept and there is yet no consensus on the 
effect it has on the performance of companies. It is the percentage of shareholdings by 
government agencies and affiliated state owned entities (Hsueh‐Liang, 2007). 
In the political arenas, the discussion on the privatization of companies that are owned 
by the state is a hot topic. In countries struggling with strong budgetary constraints, the 
privatization of companies owned by the state has been adopted as a measure to 
generate cash and reduce expenditure and public debt. 
In this context, the discussion on the sale of companies of the state in strategic sectors 
for the countries arises, as the governments applying privatization strategies argue that 
the presence of the state is bad for their performance because it makes them less 
efficient, while the opponents state that privatization processes imply loss of welfare for 
the populations. The sector of electricity and gas is a very clear example of this issue. 
The pace of change in the economic and technological characteristics of the electricity, 
hence, natural gas, supply industries have stimulated the evolution of regulation, 
ownership, and market structure. As transmission and distribution are currently 
characterized by natural monopoly cost conditions (Kiesling, 2006), the industry as a 
whole is taken to be a natural monopoly, suggesting that an efficient regulatory 
framework is a legal monopoly.  
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However, monopoly leads to deadweight losses when a profit-maximising monopolist 
charges prices that exceed marginal cost (Steiner, 2000). According to Steiner (2000), 
this led governments to adopt one of two approaches to the electricity sector: publicly 
owned, integrated monopoly, or privately owned regulated firms. Several countries (e.g. 
Ireland, France, Greece, and Italy) chose to consolidate and nationalize their electricity 
supply industries into state-owned, legal monopolies under the assumption that a state-
owned enterprise does not maximise profit, so public ownership should lead to greater 
consumer welfare. In the case of private but regulated monopolies firms have the goal 
of maximising profits.  
In these cases, regulation is the tool used to reduce perverse impacts on consumer 
welfare. This is important, because it addresses the main purposes of this study, to 
assess if the presence of the state as a shareholder impacts in the goal definition of the 
companies, and their performances as a consequence. 
For purposes of this work, it will be computed directly and indirectly, if the State does 
not hold directly stocks of a company, but instead controls a shareholder of that 
company. 
2.3. Corporate Performance 
The term performance applied in the corporate world usually defines the profitability 
obtained by a company for a certain financial year, and sometimes refers to the quality 
of the products sold or the services provided by a company. This concept is also related 
to firm market value, according to Wu (2011), among other authors. 
For purposes of this work, the performance of the companies is quantified with different 
indicators.  
In order to compare all of the companies, listed and non-listed, it will be used the 
Return on Assets (ROA), calculated by dividing the Net Income by the Total Assets, 
and the Return on Equity (ROE), calculated by dividing the Net Income by the 
shareholder’s equity, to measure profitability.  
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These profitability indicators are appropriate to analyse the performance of the 
companies and have a high correlation with the market-to-book ratio, according to 
Palich, Carini, and Seaman (2000) and (Thomsen & Pedersen, 2000), which will be 
used as a proxy for the firm value. The market-to-book ratio is measured as the market 
value of equity plus the book value of debt divided by the book value of total assets.  
Additionally, daily stock returns will be used to measure the performance of listed 
companies, as this measure also has a high correlation with the market-to-book ratio, 
according to the authors mentioned.  
Assuming no dividends, daily stock returns will be given by the following formula: 
𝑅′𝑡 =  𝑃𝑡
𝑃𝑡−1
 − 1,     (2.1.) 
where Pt is the stock closing price on day t. 
2.4. Ownership unbundling 
Ownership unbundling is a very important concept in this specific industry, specifically 
due to the regulatory environment that surrounds the gas industry.  
This concept is defined as the strictest regulatory regime of vertical disintegration, as 
the company that owns and operates the transmission assets is fully separated from the 
rest of the system, it does not participate in further business activities in retail or 
production and import (Growitsch & Stronzik, 2014). 
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2.5. Gas Transmission industry analysis 
The industries related to natural resources necessary to produce energy are of critical 
importance to overall economies around the world. The gas industry is not an exception, 
as there is the need by the consumers to have competitive markets.  
According to the ACER/CEER (2014), in competitive markets, retail and wholesale 
markets are closely interrelated. High liquidity and efficiency, combined with 
transparent and non-discriminatory gas network access mechanisms, are important in 
promoting competition and efficient price formation in the EU gas value chain. 
According to Roland Berger (2014), in the Study regarding grid infrastructure 
development: European strategy for raising public acceptance, throughout Europe 
efforts have been made to develop and integrate the power transmission networks in 
order to provide a safe, reliable, sustainable and affordable supply of energy to citizens 
in Europe, as this is of major importance for the well-being and quality of life of people 
in Europe. 
Transmission System Operators (TSO’s) 
The main players in the part of the supply chain of gas are the TSO’s, which are 
companies which own and operate electrical power transmission grid lines (high-
voltage main power lines) and are in charge of the transportation of electrical energy. 
Usually, these companies are the main owners of grid development projects, as they are 
the main entity responsible for planning and constructing new grid lines. 
In straight connection with the main issue of the present study, which is the impact of 
the state ownership in corporate performance, TSO’s are usually private sector 
companies in which governments may have a significant share. In the EU, the grid 
covered by one TSO comprises normally the entire area of a Member State. As these 
companies don’t face competition in their coverage areas, which is why they 
characterize these markets as “natural monopolies”, there is high regulation by the 
government authorities, including Regulators and Permitting authorities.  
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Consequently, their freedom in planning and constructing new grid lines is limited by 
the restrictions defined by these entities.  
The main revenues of TSO’s come from the charges they receive for the transmission of 
gas or electrical energy. The need for grid development projects may be driven by 
bottlenecks in the system, demand management and integration of renewable energy 
production. 
As the main project developers, these companies are involved in every stage of grid 
projects with a continuously vital role. Additionally, regarding the channels for 
participation, they are also the most important communicators in grid projects. In their 
communication campaigns they can make use of all available communication measures. 
On one hand, addressing the potential offered by renewables integration, resolution of 
bottlenecks and other drivers represents a big opportunity for grid development. On the 
other hand, the regulations faced impose strict restraints on these operators. Because of 
these restraints, TSO’s usually can’t choose freely where and with which design to build 
grid lines and their profit margins normally are limited.  
This makes it more relevant to study if the presence of the state in the ownership 
structure impacts in the profitability or performance of firms in this industry, because 
they are strongly dependent on political decisions, given that any change of legislation 
can have strong effects on their businesses. 
Regulators 
Another crucial player in the gas markets is constituted by the regulation entities. In the 
gas market (and electricity as well), the regulatory agencies are in charge of ensuring 
non-discriminatory third-party access to networks and of regulating the fees. 
Additionally, they are responsible for ensuring network security and supply 
(ACER/CEER, 2014). 
 10 
 
Their main function is to promote competition, hence, protecting the interests of 
consumers. The interests of the consumers are usually seen in the broadest sense. Its 
analysis takes into account the reduction of greenhouse gases and the security of the 
supply of gas or electricity, and not only prices charged to the consumers. 
Either by identifying investment gaps within national power lines (and at an European 
level with respect to cross-border capacities), or by the planning of new grid lines, 
regulators have a very important influence in the markets, as they assess and monitor 
the implementation of the investment plans of TSO’s.  
Moreover, they play an important role in determining the resources that TSO’s can 
allocate for choice of technology, stakeholder engagement and other aspects of the 
projects, since they have to sign off on TSOs’ investment plans. 
2.6. Theoretical framework to address ownership structure impact 
on performance 
The awareness that ownership affects performance is firstly based in the misalignment 
between the goals of managers, owners or individual shareholders (or groups of 
shareholders), because of the existence of different incentives (Karathanassis & Drakos, 
2004).  
The existence of different types of shareholders also deserves particular attention in the 
business research’s agenda. Differences in the type of shareholder may imply the 
existence of differences in the goals for the company, such as it is described in the 
agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which makes it very important in a context 
of value maximization of the firm for the shareholders. 
Analysing more specifically the types of shareholding, the presence of the State in the 
ownership seems to play a very important role.  
As mentioned above, transmission and distribution are characterized by natural 
monopoly cost conditions (Kiesling, 2006) and monopoly leads to deadweight losses 
when a profit-maximising monopolist charges prices that exceed marginal cost (Steiner, 
2000).  
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By adopting publicly owned, integrated monopoly, or privately owned regulated firm 
models, governments indicate that the presence of the state as a shareholder makes a 
significant difference in the electricity and gas sector, whether because it internalizes 
losses in order to increase the general welfare, or because it has a positive effect in the 
business of the companies. 
State ownership in some cases imply that companies have privileged channelling of 
funds to the company by the governments and political connections (Yu, 2013), as an 
example of a positive influence, but also because it shows value-reducing effects on the 
companies’ performance (Wu, 2011) due to increased bureaucracy for high levels of 
state ownership. 
The importance of state ownership becomes strengthened when combined with 
environments with high market rivalry and high corporate ownership ties (Wu, 2011). 
According to this author, a competitive environment, characterized by the absence of 
production rents, goes against the negative influence of minority state ownership on the 
perceived value of a firm in the marketplace. In markets in which the competition is 
higher, in which the ability to design and implement competitive strategies is essential 
to corporate success, information about managerial efforts is also more accessible for 
both public and private owners, and the interests of both are more likely to match.  
Moreover, high competition brings out market-imposed disciplines, which make 
shareholders develop their financial and business acumen, adapt to changes in 
technology, and be more attentive to cost–revenue relationships. On the other hand, 
state ownership in minority is more likely to behave passively and follow the value-
maximizing goal in such a context. 
The industry may also be an important factor of influence when it comes to the 
importance of the state ownership in the performance. For instance, technological 
preferences have influenced ownership and market structure. Certain generating 
technologies have frequently resulted in state-ownership. The State normally has the 
property rights and the financial resources necessary to engage in large-scale projects. 
Larger-scale technologies with high fixed costs often lead to State financing, while 
smaller scale technologies tend to benefit private ownership (Steiner, 2000). 
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Although the State plays, as it was mentioned above, a very important role in the 
performance of companies, it is also important to mention the role of institutional 
investors, as they seem to be positively related to the corporate value of the firms 
(Karathanassis & Drakos, 2004). 
2.7. Critical analysis of the literature 
The literature review presented above provides tools and arguments regarding the 
impact of the ownership structure in the corporate performance. 
Wu (2011) and Gunasekaragea, Hessb, and Hu (2007) propose a non-linear relation 
between state ownership and the performance of firms, as there is a certain level above 
which the increase in the state ownership decreases the performance and corporate 
value. Additionally, Karathanassis and Drakos (2004) find that corporate performance is 
positively influenced by institutional investors. 
Since the gas industry network segments (transmission and distribution) are regulated, 
the expected gains of this activity are relatively controlled, as are the costs of operating 
it. Either by identifying investment gaps within national power lines (and at an 
European level with respect to cross-border capacities), or by the planning of new grid 
lines, regulators play a very important role in the markets, as they assess and monitor 
the implementation of the investment plans of TSO’s. Furthermore, they are important 
in determining the resources that TSO’s can allocate for choice of technology, 
stakeholder engagement and other aspects of the projects, since they have to sign off on 
TSOs’ investment plans. The regulatory policies play a very important role, as past and 
current policies have led to a profit decline for midstream energy companies 
(Weijermars, 2011).   
Hence, the ownership structure is likely to have an important role in the setting of the 
strategic goals for the firms and, consequently, in their performance. However, no 
literature has until now focused on the gas transmission industry. 
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Several studies clearly stress the importance of state ownership, as it remains high in 
sectors that strategic, such as the oil, natural gas, mining or publishing, among other 
(Wei & Varela, 2003), and shows a positive relationship with state ownership (Ng, 
Yuce, & Chen, 2009). This relation between state ownership and strategic industry 
status is explanatory of the importance of the study being performed. 
Moreover, in countries where investment protection is very poor, the legal system and 
regulatory enforcement are weak, Boubakri, Cosset, and Guedhami (2005) conclude 
that companies that have lower state ownership levels might have large controlling 
shareholder or mixed ownership structures. In this context, and taking into account that 
investors do not have incentives or resources to control management, dispersed 
ownership creates a free-rider problem (Ng et al., 2009). 
Companies that have a large controlling shareholder that has the ability and the power 
to supervise and channel funds from small investors do not benefit from small state 
ownership (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000) (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, & 
Shleifer, 1999).  
However, when the state ownership increases, the government and other state agencies 
put more effort in the firms in which the state has larger shareholdings, as they gain 
preferential treatment by the government itself. In these cases, it is clear that state 
ownership has a positive impact in the firms’ performance. Additionally, due to the 
regulatory environment surrounding the gas transmission industry, the ownership 
(un)bundling may also impact the performance of firms, although it does not affect 
significantly the prices (Growitsch & Stronzik, 2014).  
The natural gas industry in Western Europe has been experiencing drastic changes 
induced by the unbundling of the national companies, followed by the liberalization of 
gas trade and the regulation of gas transmission (Pelletier & Wortmann, 2009).  
Again, there is no literature that analyses the impact of the type of regulation on the 
performance of the firms in the gas transmission industry. 
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This constitutes a gap in the literature, which reinforces the importance of studying this 
relationship in this stage of the value chain of production and distribution of gas, the gas 
transmission.   
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3. Methodology 
In order to assess the relations abovementioned, in this section it will be presented a 
model that assesses the relation between state ownership and performance and estimates 
the impact on the performance of the companies. 
Firstly, it will be presented the process of construction of the sample, by means of an 
acceptance/rejection matrix, in order to obtain only companies that constitute TSO’s.  
Then, it will be presented a description of the main financial indicators in order to 
compare, as a way of introduction, the profitability.  
Afterwards, it will be presented the model built to assess the impact of state ownership 
in the performance of these companies. 
3.1. Model design 
Panel data is used to test the relationship between state ownership and corporate 
performance. The econometric model is specified below: 
𝑌𝑖𝑡 =  𝛽𝑋𝑖𝑡 +  𝛼𝑖𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖𝑡 +  𝜀𝑖𝑡   (3.1.) 
Here, Yit represents dependent variables to measure corporate performance for firm i at 
time t, including stocks daily returns, market-to-book ratio, ROA and ROE. Xit 
represents the explanatory variable, state ownership, β is the coefficient to be estimated, 
αi is the firm fixed effect and 𝛾t is the date fixed effect.  
The panel data analysis techniques are used to analyse the impact of state ownership in 
corporate performance. According to Gujarati (2004), panel data is better to study the 
dynamics of change. 
Additionally, according to Hsiao (1986), panel data models provide several advantages 
comparing to cross-sectional data models or to the time series, because it control the 
heterogeneity of individuals. Panel data give models a greater amount of information, 
higher data diversity, less multicolinearity between variables, more degrees of freedom 
and a more significant efficiency in estimates. 
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Panel data include fixed effects and random effects estimators. In the present work, 
these estimators are compared by using the Hausman test. 
Dependent variable and explanatory variables 
The dependent variable is the performance of the companies, measured, as 
abovementioned, by: 
 Market-to-book ratio; 
 Daily stock returns; 
 ROA; and 
 ROE 
As above-mentioned, state ownership is the main explanatory variable, which is 
measured by the percentage of state ownership, and the quadratic form of the state 
ownership is also tested in this work, as it has been shown by previous empirical 
evidence that state ownership has a quadratic function with firm performance (Wei, Xie, 
& Zhang, 2005), (Gunasekarage, Hess, & Hu, 2007), (Tian & Estrin, 2008). 
3.2. Data and Sample 
The construction of the sample began with the search of companies that operate in the 
gas transmission activity. This search was firstly carried out in the website of Gas 
Infrastructure Europe (GIE)
1
. This is an association representing the interest of the 
infrastructure industry in the natural gas industry, such as Transmission System 
Operators (TSO’s). Currently, it has 68 members in 25 European countries. 
In order to refine the sample to get only the companies that operate in gas transmission, 
an acceptance/rejection matrix was constructed in order to document this process. Only 
companies that operate in the transmission of gas in Europe were accepted. The final set 
is constituted by 28 companies.  
                                                                
1
 The website of GIE is http://www.gie.eu/index.php/about-us/gie-members/gie-members. 
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The search process started with the identification of the official website of the company, 
source from which one can obtain the relevant information regarding the activity carried 
out by each company and the financial data for the calculation of the performance 
indicators. 
By analysing the information in the websites and the annual reports, companies that do 
not carry out the activity of transmission of gas were rejected. Additionally, in order to 
provide more details to the search process, it were documented the companies that 
simultaneously perform the activity of transmission of gas and electricity. Moreover, it 
was detailed the ownership structure of each company, with the purpose of classifying 
each one of them as state owned or private. 
This process led to the rejection of 40 entities, leaving the final set with 28 gas 
transmission companies. 
The following table contains relevant information regarding the activity and ownership 
status of each of the companies of the final set in the year of 2014. 
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Table 1 - Final set of TSO Companies 
Company Activity Ownership 
Bulgartransgaz EAD 
Bulgartransgaz EAD is a combined operator performing licensed activities of natural gas 
transmission and storage. 
State owned 
Enagás S.A. 
Enagas is the Technical Manager of the Spanish Gas System and the main carrier of natural 
gas in Spain.  
State Owned 
Eustream, a.s. Transport natural gas in Slovakia and through Slovakia to the European markets.  State owned 
Fluxys S.A. (LNG) Natural Gas transmission Private 
Földgázszállító Zrt. high-pressure natural gas transmission State owned 
Gas Connect Austria GmbH 
Gas Connect Austria is Europe’s gas transportation partner in Austria. 
 
With an approximately 930-km-long natural gas high-pressure pipeline grid in Austria and an 
entry/exit volume of 111 billion cubic meters per year, Gas Connect Austria has established 
itself firmly on the European natural gas landscape. 
State owned 
Gaslink Independent System 
Operator Ltd. 
From July 4th 2008, Gaslink is the Transmission System Operator (TSO) and Distribution 
System Operator (DSO) and is responsible for operating, maintaining and developing Ireland's 
natural gas transmission and distribution systems. 
Private 
Gassco AS 
As operator, Gassco is responsible for safe and efficient gas transport from the Norwegian 
continental shelf and will be a leading gas transporter in Europe 
State owned 
Gasum Oy Gas transmission State owned 
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Company Activity Ownership 
Gasunie Transport Services B.V. 
Gasunie Transport Services B.V. (GTS) is owner and the national transmission operator in the 
Netherlands. GTS is responsible for the management, operation and development of the gas 
transport system in the Netherlands. 
State owned 
Gate terminal B.V. 
Gas storage 
 
supply, a buffer between supply and continuous supply of natural gas, evaporation, runoff 
State owned 
GRTgaz S.A. 
GRTgaz owns and operates the longest high-pressure natural gas transmission network in 
Europe 
State owned 
Hellenic Gas Transmission 
System Operator S.A. 
Gas transmission State owned 
Interconnector (UK) Limited 
IUK is a joint venture company dedicated to the safe, efficient and flexible transportation of 
gas. 
Private 
N.V. Nederlandse Gasunie 
Gasunie is a European gas infrastructure company. We provide the transport of natural gas and 
green gas in the Netherlands and the Northern part of Germany. 
State owned 
National Grid Gas plc 
We are an international electricity and gas company based in the UK and northeastern US. We 
play a vital role in connecting millions of people safely, reliably and efficiently to the energy 
they use. 
Private 
NET4GAS, s.r.o. 
We hold an exclusive gas Transmission System Operator (TSO) licence in the Czech 
Republic, operating more than 3,800 km of pipelines, guaranteeing secure and reliable gas 
transport 
Private 
Ontras Gastransport GmbH ONTRAS is a trans-regional gas transmission system operator in the European grid system Private 
Open Grid Europe GmbH Germany's leading gas transmission company Private 
Operator Gazociągów 
Przesyłowych GAZ-SYSTEM 
S.A 
GAZ-SYSTEM’s key task is the transport of gas via the transmission network throughout the 
country to supply with gas the distribution networks and final customers connected to the 
transmission system. 
State owned 
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Company Activity Ownership 
PLINACRO d.o.o. Gas transmission State owned 
Plinovodi d.o.o. Plinovodi d.o.o. is a company managing the natural gas transmission network.  State owned 
REN Gasodutos S.A Gas transmission State owned 
Snam Rete Gas S.p.A. 
Snam Rete Gas is the leading Italian company in the transportation and dispatching of natural 
gas. 
State owned 
Swedegas AB Gas transmission Private 
Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH 
Trans Austria Gasleitung GmbH is a natural gas undertaking responsible for the transportation 
of natural gas 
State owned 
TRANSGAZ S.A. Gas transmission State owned 
Transport et Infrastructures Gaz 
France, S.A. 
We offer and develop natural gas transport and storage solutions for the European market,  State owned 
Source: The author, upon collection of data from the companies’ websites and annual reports.
 21 
 
Taking into account the status of these companies in 2014, they were divided into two 
sub-samples: state owned companies and private companies. A  brief financial analysis 
was performed to their profitability from1999 to 2014. 
This analysis was performed by comparing the indicators ROA and ROE of the 
companies for the period mentioned, considering the ownership status at 2014. The 
following table shows the main descriptive statistics regarding the profitability of these 
companies. 
Table 2 - TSO's profitability analysis 
Indicator State Owned Private 
ROA   
Average 6,19% 6,89% 
Minimum -50,35% -11,27% 
Maximum 61,05% 31,82% 
ROE   
Average 15,32% 31,63% 
Minimum -44,66% -18,48% 
Maximum 86,86% 201,47% 
Source: The author, upon calculation of the descriptive statistics of the indicators obtained in the database Amadeus. 
The table above shows that, for the period considered, the companies that were private 
at the end of 2014 had a better profitability than the state owned ones.  
The average ROA and ROE is higher for the private companies, but also the extreme 
values (i.e. minimum and maximum) are more favourable to the private ones. A 
question is to be asked:  
One may say, according to this data, that private companies in the gas transmission 
industry outperform the stated owned ones? 
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The analysis performed is a very static one, as it is considered that companies have the 
same ownership status throughout the whole period. It happened that the ownership 
structure of these companies has changed during this period, so this becomes a dynamic 
process. 
Hence, there is the need to capture the impact of the state ownership on companies’ 
performance when it changes. In order to do so, a model was built to estimate this 
relation but using panel data, varying the state ownership of these companies across 
time. 
As it was referred before, the performance of the companies is measured by different 
variables, ROA, ROE, daily stock returns and market-to-book ratio. The data for the 
market variables was exported from the Datastream database and the data for the 
profitability indicators was obtained from the Amadeus database and from the 
companies’ annual reports. 
Regarding the market data, it is important to state that some of the companies analysed 
are not the TSO’s, but their holding companies. For purposes of this analysis, it is 
assumed that the behaviour of the market performance of these companies is a good 
proxy of the behaviour of the firm that actually performs the activity of transmission of 
gas, as the market performance of those listed holdings is influenced by the 
performance of the TSO’s, their subsidiaries. 
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Multicolinearity Test 
Before analysing the regression results for each of the proxies of firm performance, the 
correlations for each model are calculated in order to test multicolinearity. The tables 
below show the results for correlation. 
Table 3 - Correlation matrix 
Model using ROA   
 ROA State Ownership 
ROA 1 -0.101646 
State Ownership -0.101646 1 
Model using ROE   
 ROE State Ownership 
ROE 1 -0.281903 
State Ownership -0.281903 1 
Model using daily returns Returns State Ownership 
Returns 1 -0.004813 
State Ownership -0.004813 1 
Model using Market-to-book 
ratio 
Market-to-book ratio State Ownership 
Market-to-book ratio 1 -0.372954 
State Ownership -0.372954 1 
Multicolinearity refers to variables where two or more variables are linearly related. The 
table above shows that the correlations of each of the variables are weak, which 
suggests that the regression is not affected by the presence of multicolinearity.  
Additionally, a Hausman test is performed to identify whether the fixed effects model is 
better than the random effects model. For models using ROA, ROE and Market-to-book 
ratio, random effects model is better. For model using daily returns, fixed effects model 
is better. 
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However, in order to figure out what is the most appropriate estimator to use, two 
questions must be answered. The first is related with the goals of the study and the 
second regards the context of the data, how it was collected and the environment that 
generated the information (Hsiao, 1992). The choice is dependent on whether the 
intention is to make an inference about the population taken from a random sample of it 
(in this case random effects is the most appropriate one) or to study the behaviour of a 
concrete individual unit (in this case fixed effects is the most appropriate one, because it 
is irrelevant if the sample is random or not. In the present study, the focus is on a 
specified number of companies, so all inferences will have to be conditional regarding 
the specific group being analysed.  
This means that it is not possible to find out a sample of companies as a random sample 
of a population with a tendency to infinite dimension, because it is very likely that it 
will represent almost all the population under analysis. Hence, the most appropriate 
estimators are the fixed effects estimators (Judson & Owen, 1999), because the results 
will be consistent and efficient. 
All models include the quadratic terms of state ownership. The following table shows 
the results of the panel data regressions. 
Table 4 - Panel data regressions of performance: 1999-2014 
Dependent 
Variables 
ROA ROE 
Market-to-Book 
ratio 
Daily stock 
returns 
Independent 
Variables 
Fixed Effects 
coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
coefficient 
Fixed Effects 
coefficient 
State Ownership -0.084004 -0.537980 -0.193996 0.017 
(State Ownership)
2
 0.061704 0.432198 0.218841 -0.016 
Constant 0.081049 0.264592 2.464568 -0.00119 
R
2
 0.640585 0.893230 0.400001 0.000709 
N 234 236 14 613 17 085 
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3.3. Discussion of results 
3.3.1. Dependent variable measured by ROA, ROE and Market-to-Book 
ratio 
Model using ROA reveals a U-shaped relation between state ownership and ROA. This 
means that initially, state ownership has a negative impact on ROA, but after a certain 
percentage of ownership, the increase in state ownership has a positive impact in ROA.  
The same relationship between state ownership and firm performance is obtained in 
models using ROE and daily market data for the market-to-book ratio.  
Although in Europe investor protection is considerable, these results suggest that lower 
levels of state ownership decrease firm value or firm performance, which is consistent 
with the literature on this subject in countries with weak investor protection (Boubakri 
et al., 2005).  
Dispersed ownership creates a free-rider problem, according to Ng et al. (2009), as 
small investors do not have the resources or the incentives to control and monitor the 
management, increasing the threat of the managers not acting in the shareholders’ best 
interests, deepening the agency problem inside the firms.  
Consequently, low levels of state ownership do not benefit firm performance and have a 
negative impact on it. According to Kurt, Abeyratna, and Martin (2010), firms that are 
owned and dominated by state agents, such as government, maintain a more important 
position on the market, and consequently outperform those firms with lower levels of 
state ownership. 
When the level of state ownership is high, the state or the government (personified by 
the bureaucrats) make additional and more diligent efforts in the firms in which it has 
higher shareholdings. As an example, large product orders or preferential treatment 
when it comes to loans, are benefits or preferential treatment that companies with higher 
levels of state ownership gain, according to Tian and Estrin (2008) and Sun (2002). 
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The variables do not present, however, individual statistical significance, a fact that 
suggests that the relationship obtained between the variables is not sufficient to infer to 
the remaining companies of the industry throughout the world, as the size of the sample 
is small and may limit the robustness of the estimations. 
3.3.2. Dependent variable measured by Daily stock returns 
On the other hand, the results obtained for the model using daily stock returns point out 
in a different direction.  
These results show a different relationship between state ownership and firm 
performance, as it reveals an inverted U-shaped relationship between these two 
variables. So, for low levels of state ownership the performance is positively influenced 
and for higher levels of state ownership this has a negative impact in firm value and 
performance. 
This behaviour of the performance of the stock prices of the listed companies of the 
sample may derive from a trade-off between the benefits of investors’ confidence 
(which has a positive relation with the increase of state ownership) and the risk of 
political interference, which has a negative impact in the investors.  
Additionally, it may have its origins in the privileged channelling of funds to the 
company by the governments and political connections (Yu, 2013), as an example of a 
positive influence, but also on the state ownership value-reducing effects on the 
companies’ performance (Wu, 2011).  
Contrarily to what is verified in the analysis of the indicators mentioned above, the 
variables present individual statistical significance, a fact that suggests that the 
relationship obtained between the variables allows inferring to the remaining companies 
of the industry. 
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4. Conclusions 
In this work, the relationship between ownership structure and corporate performance is 
tested in the gas transmission industry in Europe.  
More specifically, state ownership impact on firm value and firm performance is tested, 
because it is the most relevant variable to assess, given the industry under analysis. 
Twenty-eight companies were selected as the most appropriate to measure this 
relationship, as they configure functionally TSO companies, operating in the gas 
transmission industry in Europe. 
The empirical work presented makes it possible to draw the above-mentioned 
relationship. It can be concluded that for models using ROA, ROE and daily market 
data for the market-to-book ratio, the results show a U-shaped relation between state 
ownership and firm performance, which is consistent with the literature on this subject 
in countries with weak investor protection, according to Boubakri et al. (2005). These 
results are puzzling taking into account that Europe has a developed financial system 
that ensures investors’ protection, and further research should be made in order to 
address this behaviour. 
It is also possible to conclude that low levels of state ownership do not benefit firm 
performance and have a negative impact on it. According to Kurt et al. (2010), firms 
that are owned and dominated by state agents, outperform firms with lower levels of 
state ownership. 
Additionally, for one of the proxies of firm performance, the daily stock returns, the 
results showed a different relationship between the variables, as the results reveal an 
inverted U-shaped relationship between state ownership and firm performances.  
The cause of this relationship may rely on a trade-off between the benefits of investors’ 
confidence (which has a positive relation with the increase of state ownership) and the 
risk of political interference, which has a negative impact in the investors.  
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It may also be caused by the privileged channelling of funds to the company by the 
governments and political connections (Yu, 2013), as an example of a positive 
influence, but also because state ownership shows value-reducing effects on the 
companies’ performance (Wu, 2011). 
However, further research should be carried out in order to find out the root of the 
differences in the performance when measured by these two different market indicators, 
i.e., the market-to-book ratio and the daily stock returns, as they convey different 
sentiments by the investors regarding the same variable, the state ownership in TSO 
companies. 
The model designed and applied for this study presents results consistent with the 
behaviour of the variables as explained in the literature. However, the variables do not 
present individual statistical significance, which can be assignable to the reduced size of 
the sample, that may not represent correctly the entire population, i.e., all the companies 
in the industry being analysed. Nevertheless, the choice of the estimators proves to be 
the most appropriate, as referred before, as the indicator R
2
 provides very positive 
results for almost all the indicators, thus indicating that the quality of the regression, 
despite of its significance, is high. 
However, the model has some limitations, namely in the assumption that the market 
indicators show a similar behaviour for the TSO’s and for their holding companies’, 
which are the ones whose results are incorporated in the study, for the indicators 
market-to-book ratio and daily stock returns.  
Additionally, the statistical significance of the variable and its quadratic form in some 
indicators may put in question the relationship that was concluded to be in line with the 
one explained in the existing literature. Hence, additional research needs to be 
performed in order to find a sample that can be representative of the industry, 
potentially expanding the analysis to other continents. 
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Even considering these limitations, the study constitutes a contribution to the scarce 
literature on the relationship between state ownership and corporate performance in the 
gas transmission industry for this specific sample, as the quality of the regression, 
measured by the indicator R
2
, is significantly high for almost every indicator of the 
corporate performance. 
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Appendices 
Table 5 – Search process of TSO’s 
Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
Astora GmbH & Co. KG 
The astora gmbh & co. Kg is one of the largest 
natural gas storage operators in europe. 
No 
W & G Beteiligungs-GmbH & Co. KG - 
indirect shareholder 
Bahia de Bizkaia Gas, 
S.L. 
Bahía de bizkaia gas supplies natural gas to 
industries, homes and commercial facilities, as 
well as to the combined cycle power plant bahía 
de bizkaia electricidad. Production and storage 
No 
Ente Vasco de la Energía (EVE) (30%); 
RREEF (30%); Enagás (40%) 
Bulgartransgaz EAD 
Bulgartransgaz ead is a combined operator 
performing licensed activities of natural gas 
transmission and storage. 
Yes 
Bulgarian Energy Holding EAD. (100%) 
ULTIMATE OWNER - STATE 
Centrica Storage Limited 
Operate the rough gas storage facility in the 
southern north sea and the easington onshore gas 
processing terminal in east yorkshire 
No Centrica plc (100%) 
Creos Luxembourg S.A. 
The company is responsible for the planning, 
implementation, maintenance and conduct of 
electrical networks high, medium and low voltage 
and high natural gas pipelines, medium and low 
pressure which it owns or which it was responsible 
for the management. 
No - 
DONG Storage 
Our business is based on procuring, producing, 
distributing and trading in energy and related 
products in northern europe 
No - 
Dragon LNG Limited 
We use natural gas to generate some of the 
electricity we use every day 
No BG Group (50%) and Petronas (50%) 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
Dunkerque LNG, SAS Owns and manages a lng terminal No 
65% of which is owned by EDF Group , 
25% by the Fluxys Group and 10% by the 
Total Group 
E.ON Gas Storage 
GmbH 
E.on gas storage gmbh pools decades of 
experience and all the e.on group’s competence in 
gas storage throughout europe 
No 
As a subsidiary of E.ON Global 
Commodities SE 
Edison Stoccaggio 
S.p.A. 
Gas storage No - 
Electricité de France, 
S.A 
Production and distribution of electricity and gas No State (84,49%) and 15,51% private investors 
Elengy S.A. 
Owns and operates the lng terminals of montoir-
de-bretagne, on france’s atlantic coast, and fos-
tonkin, on the shores of the mediterranean. 
No PART OF THE GDF SUEZ GROUP 
Enagás S.A. 
Enagas is the technical manager of the spanish gas 
system and the main carrier of natural gas in spain. 
Yes 
Sepi and Oman Oil Company S.A.O.C, with 
a 5% share each. Enagás is one of the 
Spanish stock market companies with 
highest free float (90%) 
Energinet.dk 
Own, operate and construct the large gas pipelines 
and make them available on equal terms to the 
enterprises that produce and transport the gas. 
No 
We are a non-profit enterprise owned by the 
Danish Climate and Energy Ministry. 
Eustream, a.s. 
Transport natural gas in slovakia and through 
slovakia to the european markets. 
Yes 
SPP Infrastructure, a.s. (100%) 
 
ultimate owner - state 
Fluxys S.A. Gas transmission No group fluxys 
Fluxys S.A. (LNG) Natural gas transmission Yes group fluxys 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
Földgázszállító Zrt. High-pressure natural gas transmission Yes 
MOL MAGYAR OLAJ-ES GAZIPARI RT. 
(100%) Which is owned by the state in 24% 
Fosmax LNG, SAS 
Commercially exploits the regasification 
capacities of the terminal and led the project to 
construct it (studies, purchasing, construction and 
start-up) 
No 
subsidiary of Elengy in which the latter has 
more than a 70% stake 
Gas Connect Austria 
GmbH 
Gas connect austria is europe’s gas transportation 
partner in austria. 
 
With an approximately 930-km-long natural gas 
high-pressure pipeline grid in austria and an 
entry/exit volume of 111 billion cubic meters per 
year, gas connect austria has established itself 
firmly on the european natural gas landscape. 
Yes 
Gas Connect Austria is a wholly owned 
subsidiary of OMV, which is owned by the 
State 
Gaslink Independent 
System Operator Ltd. 
From july 4th 2008, gaslink is the transmission 
system operator (tso) and distribution system 
operator (dso) and is responsible for operating, 
maintaining and developing ireland's natural gas 
transmission and distribution systems. 
Yes 
independent subsidiary of Ervia (formerly 
Bord Gáis Éireann) 
Gassco AS 
As operator, gassco is responsible for safe and 
efficient gas transport from the norwegian 
continental shelf and will be a leading gas 
transporter in europe 
Yes 
All the 
shares are owned by the Ministry of 
Petroleum and 
Energy on behalf of the Norwegian 
government. 
Gasum Oy Gas transmission Yes 
The Finnish state owns 75%, of which 
Gasonia Oy's holding 48.5 % and National 
Emergency Supply Agency´s holding is 26.5 
%. 
OAO Gazprom owns 25 %. Gazprom is a 
Russian natural gas and oil group and the 
world’s leading producer of natural gas. 
 33 
 
Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
Gasunie Transport 
Services B.V. 
Gasunie transport services b.v. (gts) is owner and 
the national transmission operator in the 
netherlands. Gts is responsible for the 
management, operation and development of the 
gas transport system in the netherlands. 
Yes 
The issued shares are held by N.V. 
Nederlandse Gasunie.  
 
Ultimate owner - State 
Gate terminal B.V. 
Gas storage 
 
supply, a buffer between supply and continuous 
supply of natural gas, evaporation, runoff 
Yes 
NV Dutch Gasunie (Gasunie) and 
Koninklijke Vopak NV (Royal Vopak) 
GAZPROM Germania 
GmbH 
Natural gas storage No GAZPROM EXPORT, A 100% 
GNL Italia S.p.A. 
Owns and manages the liquefied natural gas (lng) 
regasification plant at panigaglia, la spezia. 
No GNL Italia is part of the Snam group 
GRTgaz S.A. 
Grtgaz owns and operates the longest high-
pressure natural gas transmission network in 
europe 
Yes 
75% GDF Suez; 25% societe 
d'infrastructures gazières 
Hellenic Gas 
Transmission System 
Operator S.A. 
Gas transmission Yes 
DESFA S.A. is 100% subsidiary company of 
DEPA S.A. 
 
Ultimate owner - state 
Interconnector (UK) 
Limited 
Iuk is a joint venture company dedicated to the 
safe, efficient and flexible transportation of gas. 
Yes 
25% Fluxys Europe B.V.;  Caisse de dépôt et 
placement du Québec (CDPQ) 23,5%; 
Gasbridge 1 B.V. 15,75%; Gasbridge 2 B.V. 
15,75%; CDP Groupe Infrastructures Inc. 
(CDPGI) 10% and Gazprom 10% 
Magyar Földgáztároló 
Zrt. 
Gas storage No - 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
MMBF Földgáztároló 
Zártkörűen Működő 
Részvénytársaság 
Gas storage No - 
N.V. Nederlandse 
Gasunie 
Gasunie is a european gas infrastructure company. 
We provide the transport of natural gas and green 
gas in the netherlands and the northern part of 
germany. 
Yes The Dutch State is our only shareholder. 
NAFTA a.s. 
Natural gas storage and underground facility 
development 
No 
SPP Infrastructure, a.s. holds the majority 
56.15 % stake; Czech Gas Holding 
Investment B.V. owns a 40.45 % stake. 
National Grid Gas plc 
We are an international electricity and gas 
company based in the uk and northeastern us. We 
play a vital role in connecting millions of people 
safely, reliably and efficiently to the energy they 
use. 
Yes 
individual shareholders, who represent more 
than 95% of the total number of shareholders 
on our share register 
National Grid Gas plc 
(Grain LNG) 
Grain lng is national grid’s liquefied natural gas 
(lng) facility at the isle of grain, near london. The 
uk’s first truly commercial lng importation 
terminal, we are the largest, by capacity, in europe 
and eighth largest in the world - with the ability to 
supply 20 per cent of the uk’s forecast gas demand 
No - 
Nederlandse Aardolie 
Maatschappij B.V 
Our main objectives are to sustain production 
from existing fields, explore for and develop new 
fields, and obtain more gas from existing fields by 
using innovative techniques. 
No 
shareholders Shell (50%) and ExxonMobil 
(50%). 
NET4GAS, s.r.o. 
We hold an exclusive gas transmission system 
operator (tso) licence in the czech republic, 
operating more than 3,800 km of pipelines, 
guaranteeing secure and reliable gas transport 
Yes Company NET4GAS Holdings, s.r.o. 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
OLT Offshore LNG 
Toscana S.p.A. 
Holds and manages the property of the floating 
regasification terminal “fsru toscana”. 
No 
IREN GROUP with 49.07%, ; E.ON 
GROUP  with 48.24%; GOLAR LNG with 
2.69% 
OMV Gas Storage 
GmbH 
Gas storage No 
43.3% free float, 31.5% ÖIAG 
(representing the Austrian government), 
24.9% 
International Petroleum Investment 
Company 
(IPIC) and 0.3% own shares. 
Ontras Gastransport 
GmbH 
Ontras is a trans-regional gas transmission system 
operator in the european grid system 
Yes 
VNG-VERBUNDNETZ GAS 
AKTIENGESELLSCHAFT - 100% 
Open Grid Europe 
GmbH 
Germany's leading gas transmission company Yes subsidiary of E.ON Ruhrgas in 2004. 
Operator Gazociągów 
Przesyłowych GAZ-
SYSTEM S.A 
Gaz-system’s key task is the transport of gas via 
the transmission network throughout the country 
to supply with gas the distribution networks and 
final customers connected to the transmission 
system. 
Yes 
Legal form: joint-stock company (100% 
shares belong to the State Treasury 
Operator Systemu 
Magazynowania Sp. z 
o.o. 
Storage system operator No 
PGNiG S.A. has created a special purpose 
vehicle company under the name of Operator 
Systemu Magazynowania Sp. z o.o. (OSM) 
PLINACRO d.o.o. Gas transmission Yes 
DIE REGIERUNG DER KROATIEN 
(100%) 
Plinovodi d.o.o. 
Plinovodi d.o.o. Is a company managing the 
natural gas transmission network. 
Yes 
Government of Republic of Slovenia 
designated the company Plinovodi d.o.o. as a 
transmission system operator. 
Podzemno skladište 
plina d.o.o. 
A national gas storage operator No - 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
POZAGAS a.s. 
This company owns and operates the láb 4 natural 
gas storage facility situated in the eastern part of 
the vienna basin close to the town of malacky. 
No 
SPP Infrastructure a.s. | 35% 
NAFTA a.s. | 35% 
GDF International S.A. | 30% 
RAG Energy Storage 
GmbH 
Gas storage No Rohöl-Aufsuchungs Aktiengesellschaft 
Regasificadora del 
Noroeste, S.A 
Receives, stores and transforms liquefied natural 
gas (lng) in a terminal located in mugardos 
No - 
REN Armazenagem S.A. Gas storage No 
REN GÁS (100%), owned by REN SGPS 
(100%) 
REN Atlântico S.A - No 
REN GÁS (100%), owned by REN SGPS 
(100%) 
REN Gasodutos S.A Gas transmission Yes 
REN GÁS (100%), owned by REN SGPS 
(100%) 
RWE Gas Storage, s.r.o. Gas storage No RWE Česká republika a.s 
RWE Gasspeicher 
GmbH 
Our team develops, operates and markets a range 
of different storage types 
No - 
Snam Rete Gas S.p.A. 
Snam rete gas is the leading italian company in the 
transportation and dispatching of natural gas. 
Yes 
CDP Reti S.r.l - 30% 
eni S.p.A. - 8,54% 
Other shareholders - 61,41% 
 
ultimate owner - state 
South Hook LNG 
Terminal Company Ltd. 
One of the largest liquefied natural gas (lng) 
terminals in europe 
No 
Qatar Petroleum International (QPI) is the 
majority Shareholder in South Hook LNG 
with a 67.5% share 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
Stogit S.p.A. 
For the storage of gas stogit uses depleted fields, 
thus safeguarding places and preserving 
environment. Gas is stored in the same safety 
conditions nature preserved it for million years. 
No snam group 
Storengy Deutschland 
Leine GmbH 
Storengy deutschland gmbh is one of the leading 
companies for the underground storage of natural 
gas in germany 
No Storengy is a subsidiary of GDF SUEZ 
Storengy S.A. 
Storengy designs, develops and operates all types 
of storage facilities 
No Storengy is a subsidiary of GDF SUEZ 
Swedegas AB Gas transmission Yes 
Swedegas has been owned since 2010 by 
EQT Infrastructure. 
 
EQT Infrastructure is part of EQT, which is 
a group of private equity funds with various 
investment specialisations. 
Swissgas AG Distribution of gas No - 
TAQA Energy B.V. 
Oil and gas exploration and production, pipelines, 
underground gas storage, power generation and 
water desalination 
No 
Abu Dhabi Water and Electricity Authority 
(ADWEA): 52.4 per cent 
- Fund for the Support of Farm Owners: 21.7 
per cent 
- Other Abu Dhabi government entities: 0.4 
per cent 
- Public shareholders: 25.6% 
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Company Activity Transmission? Ownership 
Terminale GNL 
Adriatico S.r.l. 
Operates the lng terminal located offshore italy, in 
the northern adriatic sea, that is the world’s first 
offshore gravity based structure (gbs) for 
unloading, storing and regasifying liquefied 
natural gas (lng) 
No 
ExxonMobil Italiana Gas (70.7%) – an 
ExxonMobil subsidiary, Qatar Terminal 
Company Limited (22%) - a Qatar Petroleum 
subsidiary, and Edison (7.3%) 
Trans Austria Gasleitung 
GmbH 
Trans austria gasleitung gmbh is a natural gas 
undertaking responsible for the transportation of 
natural gas 
Yes 
CDP GAS S.r.l. now holds 84.5 % of the 
shares and Gas Connect Austria GmbH holds 
15.5 % of the shares 
 
Ultimate owner - State 
TRANSGAZ S.A. Gas transmission Yes 
The Romanian State by the General 
Secretariat of the Government  
6.888.840 
58,5097 % 
Shareholders - Natural and Legal Persons  
4.885.004 
41,4903 % 
Transport et 
Infrastructures Gaz 
France, S.A. 
We offer and develop natural gas transport and 
storage solutions for the european market, 
Yes TOTAL S.A. (100%) 
VNG Gasspeicher 
GmbH 
Gas storage No 
wholly-owned subsidiary of VNG-
Verbundnetz Gas AG 
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